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All theories of justice aim to promote some good,
or set of goods, for the benefit of persons such that
the lives of individuals go reasonably well, and
such that the benefits are fairly distributed in one
way or another. All theories of justice further aim
to specify, if only in broad strokes, the rights and
responsibilities persons should have or enjoy, and
how those rights and responsibilities should pro-
mote or at least compliment the interests of those
possessing them. But strong theories of justice
must also provide a justification for the coercive
interference of the state, as well as some kind of
principled guidance concerning how best to man-
age conflicting interests in deeply pluralist socie-
ties, where ideas about the good life sharply differ
and where well-intended policies enacted by
the state affect the lives of citizens in very
different ways.
At the heart of any theory of justice lies
the principle of equality. Taking equality seriously
means that we ought to consider the ways in
which persons are not only unfairly advantaged
or disadvantaged from the start – e.g., through
genetic inheritance, wealth, or a parent’s educa-
tional background – but also how opportunities
and rewards that result from these basic
inequalities are later exacerbated in the distribu-
tion of goods and opportunities. The basic point of
equality as a normative principle is not that every-
one have similar things or achieve similar out-
comes, that would be undesirable both for
reasons having to do with individual liberty as
well as social need. Just as individuals may desire
or be capable of different things, so too will soci-
ety benefit not from everyone being exactly alike
but rather reflecting a diverse array of perspec-
tives, talents, and skills. But as a normative prin-
ciple equality can help us do three things: first, it
can help us to identify the inequalities that matter
from a moral point of view. Second, it can help us
to figure out how we might design or reform our
social institutions so as to reduce, and in some
cases perhaps even eliminate, unfair inequality.
Third, it can help us to navigate hard decisions
concerning the distribution of resources and
opportunities.
Which Inequalities Matter?
Some of the most basic philosophical work to be
done involves simply identifying which kinds of
inequalities matter from a moral point of view.
This is not always an easy task. To illustrate,
consider the following case. Clark is an avid jazz
enthusiast, and over time, he has accumulated a
large record collection. In the general distribution
of societal goods, Clark’s having amassed a
large record collection arguably is not morally
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significant. Though his emotional or spiritual life
may be enriched on account of the music he has at
his disposal, and he may enjoy sharing his knowl-
edge and experience with other jazz aficionados,
his having this record collection per se does not
advantage him relative to the goods and opportu-
nities available to others. And though he may
imagine it to be otherwise, the quality of an ordi-
nary life does not hinge on knowing anything
about jazz, as absurd as this may sound to Clark.
But if we widen the lens just a bit, we also
notice that Clark was born into a middle-class
family with well-educated parents; not only did
they cultivate his love of music, they too are
career musicians. These more detailed back-
ground conditions – in particular who his parents
are – have benefited him in myriad ways, includ-
ing his genetic traits, the neighborhood in which
he grew up (within walking distance of a magnet
school specializing in music), the private music
lessons he has enjoyed, his music-loving peer
group, the conservatory where he chose to study,
the mentors with whom he came into contact, and
the kinds of intrinsically rewarding work he later
pursued. Thus taken in isolation, the record col-
lection is neither here nor there with respect to
equality. But, the more information we have about
Clark, the more his record collection appears to
constitute a larger set of facts about his advantages
that aremorally significant from the standpoint of
justice. Further, given the scarcity of satisfying
musical careers for which Clark’s experiences
undoubtedly provide an advantage, there are rea-
sons to believe that many of the rewards that he
enjoys for his choices, hard work, and talent are
not, strictly speaking, deserved.
Yet, while we may recognize Clark’s
undeserved advantages, many of us still will be
inclined to view the rewards he enjoys for his
musical talents as being well-deserved. After all,
talent and hard work should count for something;
if they didn’t, there would be very little incentive
for many persons to work hard or cultivate their
latent talents and skills, pursuing excellence.
Excellence in particular seems to have an inde-
pendent value of its own that we have reason to
value. Thus, arguably, while Clark may not
deserve his traits or circumstances over which he
has no control, it is still acceptable from the stand-
point of justice that he benefit from choices that he
has made, just as it is acceptable that he be held to
account for what he has chosen to do or not do.
But this is too quick, for there are at least three
difficulties that immediately arise. The first diffi-
culty is that it will be virtually impossible to
separate Clark’s talent, motivation, and hard
work from the background conditions under
which they have developed. After all, his choice
to take up an instrument, devote himself to weekly
tutorials and daily practice, take advanced place-
ment musical theory courses in his magnet school,
listen to a great deal of music in his free time, and
pursue both a college degree and career in music
correlate very strongly with his (undeserved)
background conditions in which his choices
were made. Hence, the benefits Clark enjoys as a
result of his musical interests, talents, and hard
work might still be seen as morally problematic.
A second difficulty is that while Clark’s talents,
work ethic, or even his love of music are
undeserved, this in itself is no argument against
further cultivating his interests, or developing his
talents, now that they are known and both his
passion and motivation for music has been dis-
covered. Even if we adopted a prioritarian princi-
ple that would require devoting more resources –
music teachers, instruments, sheet music – to
those less fortunate than Clark, that would be no
argument for neglecting Clark; equality would
still require that we also treat him fairly, and not
only those less fortunate than himself. Indeed,
an interpretation of equality that ignored
(or minimized) the interests of Clark, or for that
matter the majority population which may not
concern itself with musical pursuits, would be
problematic from the standpoint of justice. But
so, too, would an interpretation of equality that
would fail to cultivate the talents of the more
advantaged simply because they acquired their
talents unfairly. Possessing talents that are
undeserved is not a decisive argument against
cultivating them nonetheless, especially if – as is
likely in many cases – doing so will yield benefits
for many others. Demonstrating the public bene-
fits arguably strengthens the case for cultivating
undeserved talent. Yet, even when a particular
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talent may not produce such obvious public
benefits – many highly talented musicians have
great difficulty procuring steady employment –
fairness constraints still require that we not
neglect said persons simply because their talent
is undeserved.
The third difficulty is one of distribution. This
is because the kinds of inequalities that we
encounter in this case, represented by Clark’s
musical interests and talent, are not the kinds of
things that are easy to distribute. Even with similar
opportunities to take up music, it is reasonable to
assume that not everyone will share Clark’s inter-
est, talents, or self-discipline where music is
concerned. However, if, as Aristotle believed, a
musical education is crucial to human flourishing
(and hence relevant to justice concerns), then
there still is a great deal we can do to mitigate
the unfairness of persons like Clark enjoying a
rich musical education and training, while count-
less others receive none.
For instance, motivated by the principle of
equality, a strong case for a compulsory musical
education can be made, rather like the principle of
equality has motivated the establishment of public
systems of education in countries around the
world; or how it has led to the redistribution of
extra resources to children born into poverty, or
who have disabilities; or how it has motivated the
revision of curricular content whose purpose was
to tell the neglected histories and perspectives of
minority groups; or how it has been used to incen-
tivize millions of individuals to use their motiva-
tion and talents for public service.
The upshot is that we may not be able to ensure
that everyone has the same childhood experi-
ences, or cares about the same things, or pursues
comparably rewarding careers. At the same time,
we could insist that the distribution of goods,
resources, and opportunities be distributed as
fairly as possible. As the foregoing illustration
suggests, this might include a compulsory music
education. To the extent that we can do this, we
will have done a great deal to mitigate egregious
inequality and perhaps even to have levelled the
playing field muchmore than would have been the
case had equality not been the operative principle.
Equality of Educational Opportunity
As a more specific articulation of equality, equal-
ity of opportunity dictates that in the distribution
of opportunities in any given society, the compe-
tition should be fair. A more Rawlsian articulation
of the principle holds that persons similarly tal-
ented and motivated should enjoy fair chances in
the competition for public offices and social posi-
tions. That is, persons with similar native endow-
ments (talent and ability), and the initiative or
motivation to put those talents to effective use,
ought to have more or less the same opportunities
to do so irrespective of their family and social
class origin. However the principle is stated,
there are several attending difficulties.
Surely one is that even a ringing endorsement
of the principle from all sides of the debate will
not settle the matter concerning the need to inter-
pret the relevant terms in ways satisfactory to all
parties. A second difficulty is that equality of
opportunity, as the principle is discussed in polit-
ical philosophy and theory, is almost always
applied to the institutional structures of nation
states. While cosmopolitan justice theory has
endeavored to extend the equality principle to
global concerns (e.g., trade, immigration, debt
relief, climate change, etc.), it is difficult to see
how equal opportunities on this scale are even
remotely realizable. Indeed, it is exceedingly dif-
ficult to achieve this even at the state level in all
but the smallest and most homogenous societies.
A third difficulty, one I return to later, is this: there
inevitably will be trade-offs between equality and
other principles, and as often as not these trade-
offs cut against equality.
In recent years, two perspectives on equality
of opportunity have come to dominate much
of the discussion vis-à-vis educational justice.
On the one hand are “sufficientarians,” who
apply the egalitarian principle not by concerning
themselves with inequality gaps – between
rich and poor, say – but rather by determining
what the minimal threshold necessary for a
decent life ought to be. Certain deficits, e.g.,
malnourishment, are inherently bad irrespective
of whether others suffer from the same
deficit; adequate nourishment, then, is a
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nonfungible good. With respect to education,
sufficientarians argue that the threshold must be
adequate to participate in democratic politics as
an equal member of society. Satisfying the level of
adequacy for everyone up to the threshold is what
matters, and no one should be permitted to fall
below that threshold. Inequality is permitted
above but not below the threshold; accordingly,
important restrictions are imposed on the kinds,
but also on the degree, of inequality permitted.
On this reading of equality, determining pre-
cisely how and which resources should be
redistributed above the threshold can only be
determined by democratic deliberation within a
particular context. For example, equality may
require that more public funding and resources
be allocated for special education for the severely
disabled, but this is not a foregone conclusion, for
the same deliberation could result in extra
resources being spent on programs for the gifted.
The point is that above the threshold, adequacy
theorists allow for discretion in responding to the
exigencies of context, as well as variable human
circumstances and need.
From the other side of this debate are those
who object to the concern with “adequacy” on
the grounds that it allows for too much inequality
above the threshold. On this reading of equality,
priority should be given to the least advantaged,
full stop. Thus in the education domain, it ought to
be the poor, disabled, and marginalized who are
given priority in the distribution of scarce goods
and opportunities. If more scarce resources are
devoted to the disadvantaged than the majority
or the most talented, egalitarians of this ilk insist
that some priorities – alleviating disadvantage –
simply trump adequacy standards. If this means
that the disadvantaged receive more scarce
resources than others, then so be it. Thus on this
reading of equality, unfair inequalities may be
permitted only when there are other reasons for
allowing and even promoting them, for example,
so that important benefits redound to the less
advantaged.
Irrespective of which of these interpretations
one prefers, both are amenable to robust egalitar-
ian interpretation and application. Similar
outcomes – both of which incidentally also permit
considerable inequality – can be reached by
adopting either interpretation. As with most ethi-
cal dilemmas, much will depend on the way in
which the different principles are understood and
applied, the variables in each case, the abundance
or scarcity of resources, and the possible out-
comes specific policy decisions may have. For
instance, both will need to decide where the base-
line for equality must be set, and moreover what
it must be set for. Should the minimum threshold
of equality require that material resources be
equally distributed? Which content should be
required to satisfy a minimum threshold? How
might the preferences of individuals (e.g.,
teachers, parents) factor into these decisions?
Even if we succeed in answering these questions,
we still must address the matter of how
much inequality above the threshold should be
permitted.
Trade-Offs
Making matters more complex, equality is not the
only game in town. Because there are equally
strong reasons to care about other values and
principles (e.g., liberty, excellence, cultural mem-
bership, family intimacy, etc.), there inevitably
will be difficult trade-offs. To illustrate these ten-
sions, let us look at one of them more closely.
Parental Partiality
Parental partiality (PP) is meant to capture the
special reasons why parents are morally justified
in lavishing time, attention, and love on their own
children. With few exceptions, parents are better
placed than most to know, understand, and attend
to their own children’s needs, and, if paired with
unconditional love from a parent, this is undoubt-
edly in the child’s interest. If all parents were more
or less equally positioned (in terms of location
and environmental conditions), well-equipped
(in terms of intelligence, education, resources,
time) and disposed (in terms of emotional and
physical strength, temperament, and habituation)
to care for their children, there might be a sense in
which we could speak of equality.
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But we all know that the reality is different, and
the child who is loved enjoys an important advan-
tage over children who are not loved very well, or
even not loved at all. Hence as with other kinds of
goods, the unequal distribution of love and atten-
tion, too, is a matter relevant to egalitarian justice.
And it is not just children who benefit from the
intimate relations of a family. In addition to the
duties of partiality that parents have toward their
own children, parents, too, have an important
interest in loving their own children. Indeed, the
lives of parents generally go better when they are
able to invest themselves in nurturing and raising
children, provided of course they have the requi-
site amount of resources and time, not to mention
a temperament suitable to parenting.
Now just because parents have valid duties and
interests vis-à-vis their own children does not
mean that they are permitted to do whatever they
want. For instance, parents who fail – whether
through abuse or neglect – in their duties to raise
their children to a minimally acceptable level may
be forced to forfeit this prerogative; indeed, the
state may take children away from their parents
because they commit, in the words of Mill, a
“moral crime.” Moreover, not all expressions of
PP are allowed to trump other concerns. But as a
general rule, parents are permitted (indeed
encouraged) to do more for their children than
they do for others as a matter of justice.
It runs counter to our intuitions that we ought
to adopt Plato’s radical proposal and abolish the
family in order to erase the inequality; equally
uninviting is the idea that we ought to “level
down” the benefits of intimacy, i.e., deny some
children love as a way of redressing the imbal-
ance. Putting aside the logistical improbabilities,
both strike us as entailing larger offenses against
justice. Yet surely one abiding difficulty here, as
we saw earlier with the example of Clark, is that
the benefits of love and affection are borne out of
intimate relations, and these cannot – indeed must
not – be “distributed” in the same way that other
kinds of resources can without violating important
moral obligations one has to one’s own child. So
there is a hard tension here, one that demands
some kind of trade-off.
Of course trade-offs need not be a zero sum
game; principles can complement and reinforce
one another. For example, whereas liberty and
equality are frequently in tension, this need not
always be the case: equality also entails securing
equal liberty for all. Though it is often the case in
the real world, taking equality seriously would
mean that wealthy citizens should not enjoy
greater influence in the exercise of their political
liberty than poor citizens. Similarly, equality-
valuing parents who can offer reasons for favoring
PP over equality measures that would diminish
that value still may insist that something rather
than nothing be done about the unfair inequalities
affecting the lives of other families, especially if
inequality can be measurably diminished. Hence
the principle of equality can motivate us to chal-
lenge unfair advantages and to think hard about
how to improve upon the existing situation. But of
course if we are to be serious about our egalitarian
principles, then we also will want to make a can-
did assessment about (a) whether our preferred
values or principles are in fact self-serving, and
(b) whether our beliefs about how best to mitigate
equality can be supported by empirical evidence.
Appling Egalitarian Principles to the
Real World
As the foregoing discussion clearly indicates, a
number of theoretical difficulties already attend
simply interpreting and prioritizing equality. Yet,
matters become immensely more intricate once
we begin applying these theoretical understand-
ings to the real world. This does not mean that
ethical difficulties are unresolvable; it does, how-
ever, mean that they are complex, particularly, as
we have seen, when the principle of equality is
amenable to different understandings and applica-
tions. Rather than using equality as a shibboleth
for meting out justice, we will need to be alert,
first, to the tensions that inevitably arise when
equally valid principles work at cross-purposes
and, second, to the particulars of individual
cases, where it is important that we consider all
of the relevant variables – including possible risks
and benefits. From either side of this debate, there
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doubtless will be different intuitions about what it
is possible to equalize, which thresholds matter,
where the lines should be drawn, and, given the
inevitability of hard tensions, about whether and
when it is it is morally responsible – versus mor-
ally complacent – to make a trade-off. To see how
equality might be applied in the real world, con-
sider two strategies relevant to educational justice.
Weighted Pupil Funding
As a redistributive measure, weighted pupil
funding (WPF) roughly requires increased per
pupil spending for students with greater educa-
tional needs, such as children with disabilities or
whose parents earn below the official poverty line.
The aim of WPF is both to compensate for disad-
vantage and improve educational opportunity. As
an egalitarian measure, WPF can make an impor-
tant difference: it can prevent schools saddled
with more acute disadvantage from slipping fur-
ther behind. Egalitarians strongly support WPF,
believing that it is an effective way to mitigate
poverty. But how well does WPF do in mitigating
inequality? Below are some reasons to guard
against unwarranted optimism.
First, though it can mitigate some of the effects
of disadvantage, WPF tells us very little about
how the additional resources contribute to a
child’s learning. After all, school boards allocate
WPF in various discretionary ways, and it remains
difficult to determine precisely how and what the
relevant effects are. Second, WPF does nothing to
prevent schools having poverty concentrations in
the first place. That is, WPF does not address
neighborhood effects, nor does it address the fact
that poor neighborhoods, and the families who
live there, are disadvantaged in a variety of other
respects. Third, and relatedly, WPF does nothing
to subtract from what more privileged families are
able to enjoy by simply avoiding high poverty
schools and neighborhoods in the first place.
Thus to support WPF and PP in equal measure is
effectively to leave the most relevant kinds of
inequality undisturbed, i.e., those that occur out-
side the school generally, and within the sphere of
intimacy more specifically.
As a general rule, redistributive accounts of
equality involve beliefs about how justice will be
accomplished once spending amounts are equita-
ble. There is no question that justice requires that
spending amounts – and the distribution of mate-
rial resources generally – ought to be fair, i.e.,
proportionate to need. Yet the difficulties with
redistributive accounts concern beliefs about
(a) which resources matter and (b) whether any
amount of resources available in the school can
meaningfully compensate for the priceless
resources generally unavailable to poor pupils
outside the school. These include but are not lim-
ited to: table talk, college and career advice,
homework assistance, museum visits, cross-
cultural exchanges, etc., all of which are typical
of the middle- and upper-class habitus. The upshot
is that one can wholeheartedly endorse full equity
with respect to resource distribution – including, in
the educational domain, the use of WPF – while
simultaneously invoking all of the nondistributive
benefits of PP insofar as this entails the transfer-
ence of social capital.
Thus while WPF certainly can help to alleviate
the effects of poverty and disadvantage, as a pol-
icy instrument its effects in compensating for
social disadvantage are ambiguous at best. First,
it does not guarantee that the right services will
reach the right students, and second, it does noth-
ing to compensate for what children lack outside
of school. These observations are not an argument
against WPF; rather, they serve to underscore the
importance of coupling this strategy with other,
much broader, equality-motivated resources and
interventions. What remains improbable, how-
ever, is whether the most relevant equality-
promoting resources – ones normally associated
both with family life and what John Ogbu called
“community forces” – can be redistributed in the
first place.
School Integration
Yet another strategy motivated by the equality
principle is school integration. Integrationist argu-
ments typically maintain that schools integrated
by race/ethnicity and especially social class will
improve the peer effects, which means that chil-
dren can learn at least as much from each other as
they do from their teachers. Further, equality-
motivated integration arguments are predicated
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on the belief that the presence of more middle-
class children in the school translates into greater
overall parental involvement, and these benefits
will redound to families with less social capital.
A related belief is that schools with more middle-
class children will assist in retaining teachers,
which contributes to the stability of the school.
Again, these beliefs are widely endorsed among
egalitarians. Even so, there are many difficulties
with the integration-for-equality account.
Surely one problem is to conflate desegrega-
tion or spatial mixing with the more demanding
conditions of true integration, which presumably
would ensure real equality of opportunity. And for
equality of opportunity to get any traction at all,
there first would need to be equality of recogni-
tion, status, and treatment. Again, equality of
treatment here would not entail sameness, but,
rather like the egalitarian logic driving WPF, it
would be proportionate to need. But the
integration-for-equality beliefs that maintain that
mixed schools will – or are even likely – to pro-
duce outcomes of equality is difficult to reconcile
with virtually everything empirical research has
reported about mixed schools for the past half
century. Indeed, it has become a platitude to
observe that school systems – such as they cur-
rently are – largely serve to reproduce inequality,
and the more mixed the school is (by social class,
but also by ability, ethnicity/race, and even cul-
ture/religion), the more stratified the educational
experience in that school we should expect.
Now while there is evidence that schools with
more middle-class children succeed in retaining
their staff at higher rates than high poverty
schools, there is little evidence to support the
claim that (a) the best teachers are assigned to
teach the pupils with greatest need or (b) that
either peer groups or classrooms – beyond the
age of eight or nine – are very heterogeneous
with respect to social background or ability, no
matter how mixed a particular school might be.
Indeed, most schools, including most magnet
schools that were designed to mitigate segrega-
tion, continue to be organized to benefit the more
privileged students, and in several European
countries children are selected as young as 10 or
12 – largely along social class lines – to follow
different tracks of secondary education. Further,
as we saw with WPF, school integration accounts
also largely ignore the enormous gap separating
what children do with their (preferred) peers and
families outside of school.
With respect to the idea that the involvement of
more middle-class parents will somehow benefit
less fortunate children in the school, this is an
egalitarian belief devoid of any corroborating evi-
dence. It is true that schools with a higher concen-
tration of well-educated parents often bring more
resources with them. But parents with more social
capital principally concern themselves with navi-
gating the system in order to benefit their own
child, for instance, by pressuring school officials
to create a gifted/talented track, challenging staff
decisions regarding class assignment, or to simply
switch schools when things do not go their way.
Again, these observations are not an argument
against school integration per se; in rare instances,
an integrated school can live up to egalitarian
ideals. At the same time, egalitarian arguments
for integration too often fail to come to terms
with the fact that a mixed school is almost never
a proxy for educational justice.
Final Thoughts
All egalitarian liberals agree on the importance of
equality as a moral principle. Yet judging by what
egalitarian liberals are willing to permit – viz., all
kinds of inequality above an acceptable
threshold – we appear to be caught in an ethical
quandary. With respect to educational justice
more specifically, at least two major difficulties
stand in the way.
The first difficulty of egalitarian liberal
accounts of educational justice is the almost
exclusive attention given to the institutional fea-
tures of education, i.e., schooling. The institu-
tional focus is understandable, given that
accounts of justice are more likely to be viewed
as legitimate when restricted to the public domain.
When the state does interfere in the private
domain – such as in cases involving abuse or
neglect – at the level of principle it is with a
view to protecting the rights, liberties, and
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opportunities of vulnerable individuals. Yet at the
empirical level, legitimate state interference
almost always transpires after an injustice has
been done. Proposals that argue for earlier inter-
vention with a view to preventing inequality from
worsening – such as monitoring parenting behav-
iors, requiring parenting classes, or mandating
preschool attendance – are often seen as need-
lessly intrusive for what they suppose about
“good parenting” and also for how they meddle
in the private affairs of family life.
To counter this, a few egalitarian liberals have
argued that we ought to ban elite private schools
(in the UK) or elite publics (such as gymnasia in
Europe). Related arguments insist that parents
ought to “level down” in other ways, so that either
more privileged children, including one’s own
children, receive less than what they deserve in
terms of an equal educational opportunity. Putting
aside the highly speculative nature of these philos-
ophy seminar room proposals, none of them
escape other kinds of problems. It is true that
banning elite schools may reduce the institutional
options available to wealthier parents and doing
this may interrupt the furtherance of certain privi-
leges. Yet it is doubtful whether this will do
anything to interrupt the social networking that
matters most; nor would these proposals likely
prevent other strategies from being pursued, such
as selecting alternative schools, homeschooling or
afterschool tutoring – each of which currently
enjoy enormous popularity, and not only among
the more socially privileged. And in any case, with
respect to levelling down, there are reasons to
think this will simply offend against justice as it
concerns the educational needs of the privileged.
A second difficulty, one that we have already
seen, is that nearly all egalitarian liberals,
irrespective of where they stand vis-à-vis ade-
quacy standards, embrace the special prerogatives
parents enjoy to shape and direct aspects of their
children’s lives. These are inescapably hard ten-
sions because persons committed to egalitarian
principles can – on the most charitable reading –
invoke another principle that allows one to say
that justice is “unreasonably demanding” when it
infringes on other things one has reason to value.
PP is quintessentially that principle, and, as we
have seen, more often than not its exercise cuts
against equality. Certainly the duties that parents
have to their own children constitute an important
element of justice. At the same time, it is precisely
these prerogatives where the real obstacles to
equality lay, with respect to educational opportu-
nity or opportunity tout court. And thus perhaps
the most disturbing outcome as it concerns equal-
ity is that we can happily endorse egalitarian pol-
icies while giving up nothing of real value where
equality appears to matter the most.
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